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Abstract  
Re-Imagining Student Achievement:  
The Egalitarian Failure of the Carrot-Stick Model in K-12 Public Education   
Michael Johnson 
 
Committee Members: Dr. Jessica Flanigan, Dr. KimMarie McGoldrick, Dr. Thomas Shields 
 
Achievement gaps between low-income and minority students and their counterparts are among 
the most pressing education policy issues today. Cash incentivization to students has gained 
momentum as a potential remedy to reduce disparities in student achievement outcomes. Grading 
incentive schemes function identically as objections to cash-incentives positioning both within 
the broader carrot-stick motivation model. Rather than eliminate the widely used grading 
scheme, however, I conclude that efforts should be redirected towards reducing the saliency of 
standardized evaluative benchmarks to which incentives are aimed as opposed to reforming the 
incentives themselves which I refer to as the Revisionary Proposal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Historically, student achievement within U.S. public education has been determined 
through standardized evaluative metrics such as statewide tests for reading, math and science. 
Achievement gaps along racial, socioeconomic, and cultural lines are strongly associated with 
long-term disparities in the future earnings, standards of living, and health indicators between 
underperforming students and students who succeed.1 For instance, roughly 15% of low-income 
8th graders tested proficient in reading compared to nearly 40% of 8th graders coming from 
middle-high income backgrounds.2 Additionally, the same study finds that the same percentage 
of low-income students score proficient in math while over 40% of their wealthier counterparts 
are proficient in math. This trend is supported by a wide body of additional sources.3,4 One 
framework to partially explain the persistence of the income achievement gap is a lack of 
motivation on behalf of underperforming students. Cash incentivization or giving money to 
students for meeting or exceeding evaluation standards, has received increased attention as a 
method to increase student motivation in hopes of reducing the income achievement gap.  
The primary research question which I will examine is: to what extent should educators 
provide cash incentives to reduce achievement gaps? To begin, I will analyze empirical evidence 
regarding the efficacy of cash incentives in improving short-run student achievement outcomes 
through various research studies. In the second section, I will build on the work of Michael 
Sandel and Debra Satz to explore the normative and ethical considerations of cash incentive 
                                               
1 “Whither Opportunity?: Rising Inequality, Schools, and Children’s Life Chances.” Choice Reviews Online 49, no. 10 (June 1, 
2012): 49-5804-49–5804.  
2 Gorski, Paul. Reaching and Teaching Students in Poverty: Strategies for Erasing the Opportunity Gap. New York, NY: 
Teachers College Press, 2018. 
3 Duncan, Greg J., Pamela A. Morris, and Chris Rodrigues. “Does Money Really Matter? Estimating Impacts of Family Income 
on Young Children’s Achievement with Data from Random-Assignment Experiments.” Developmental Psychology 47, no. 5 
(September 2011): 1263–79.  
4 García, Emma, and Elaine Weiss. “Education Inequalities at the School Starting Gate,” n.d., 102. 
 
 
 
structures; in particular, their effects on the intrinsic value of education. Next in the third section, 
I will make the connection between cash and other extrinsic incentives, specifically grades, 
which both fall under the umbrella term known as the carrot-stick model. This model forms the 
traditional incentive-reward system in which the carrot represents incentivizing desired values 
while the stick represents punishing undesirable values.5 I argue that educators should reject the 
current grading system on the same empirical and normative grounds as they should reject cash 
incentives, not in principle, but within the inherently biased evaluative framework that 
discourages and de-values those who do not conform to narrowly defined standards. 
Consequently, I argue that changes to the motivational structure within public education must 
ultimately follow a re-conceptualization of the evaluative metrics which determine student 
achievement outcomes by reducing the saliency of standardized testing, also referred to as the 
Revisionary Proposal. Lastly, I consider and ultimately reject the objection argued by 
Christopher Knapp which argues that the Revisionary Proposal model would further exacerbate 
educational disparities. I reject this objection by consulting the work of Jennifer Morton and 
Christopher Emdin who provide striking evidence regarding the clash between standardized 
evaluative metrics and the cultural identities of students from marginalized backgrounds.  
§1: Cash Incentives and Instrumental Value 
The ultimate purposes of education are understood to be both instrumentally and 
intrinsically valuable. Strict instrumentalists generally point to economic indicators such as 
employment rates after graduation, income level, and health outcomes to evaluate the success of 
education for individuals and across localities. The instrumental value of education comprises 
the first principle of educational egalitarianism. Regarding this principle, two frames of thought 
                                               
5 Hess, Frederick M., and Andrew P. Kelly. Carrots, Sticks, and the Bully Pulpit: Lessons from a Half-century of Federal Efforts 
to Improve Americas Schools. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press, 2011. 
 
 
 
exist surrounding the concept of equal opportunity. The first, equality in opportunity, contends 
that educational resources and opportunities should be distributed equally across students, 
irrespective of outcome. The second, which I will refer to as equality in outcome, argues that 
disparities in the provision of educational resources are justified insofar as the short and long-
term outcomes are equal for all students. Going forward, I focus on the second conception of 
educational egalitarianism as the ideal to which domestic public education should achieve. 
Although the systemic implementation of cash incentives appeared promising, the following 
empirical research finds that cash incentives are ineffective in improving the achievement 
outcomes of underperforming students and only slightly effective at best.  
Roland Fryer, a Harvard economist, conducted a series of experiments in Dallas, 
Chicago, and New York in which his research team conducted a study examining the extent to 
which financial incentives improve student achievement. From 2007 - 2009, he distributed over 
$9 million to over 27,000 students across the three cities.6 In Dallas, he conducted his experiment 
on elementary school students, while in New York he tested middle school students and high 
school students in Chicago. Because the focus of my thesis is concerned with incentives and 
student achievement at the secondary level, I will only consult the results from his Chicago 
experiment. Almost 8,000 9th graders participated in his study, half of which were in the 
treatment group (which received financial incentives) and the other half in the control group. For 
every A that a student received, he/she would receive $50 as a financial reward, $35 for every B, 
and $20 for every C. If a student received a D, they would receive no money and a student who 
                                               
6 Fryer, Roland G. 2011. “Financial Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from Randomized Trials.” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (4): 1755–98.  
 
 
 
received an F would not receive a financial reward in addition to losing any money they were 
rewarded within that period. 7 
With this scale, students could earn up to $250 every 5 weeks or $2,000 a year. Chicago 
is extremely compelling in my examination of student achievement as over 88% of students in 
chicago public high schools are black or hispanic, 75% are eligible for free and reduced lunch 
and almost 15% are english language learners. Surprisingly, the results from Fryer’s study 
depicted a very minimal impact of the financial incentive structure in improving the achievement 
outcomes of the underperforming students in the district. 9th graders witnessed zero effect on 
Illinois standardized tests which served as the primary outcome metric.8 G.P.A. for this group 
improved very slightly at about .93σ, while student on average earned additional credits 
translating into approximately half a full course.9 
 The second experimental research design of our study was conducted by Kirabo Jackson 
and was labeled the AP Incentive Program (APIP).10 APIP began in 1996 and was initiated in 10 
high schools across Dallas, Texas. APIP has produced minimal improvements in academic 
performance measures, such as AP scores and number of students who enroll in a college or 
university. According to the study, the number of students scoring above a 1100 on the SAT 
increased by 30%, and the number of high school students who enroll in a college or university 
increased by 8%.11 Despite this, Jackson found no statistically significant evidence to suggest that 
APIP encouraged a greater number of students to take the AP exam or produced higher 
graduation rates. While the results depict that the biggest demographics resulting in the increase 
                                               
7 Ibid. 1761.  
8 Ibid. 1757.  
9 Ibid. 1758.  
10 Jackson, C. Kirabo. “A Little Now for a Lot Later A Look at a Texas Advanced Placement Incentive Program.” Journal of 
Human Resources 45, no. 3 (July 1, 2010): 591–639.  
11“Cash for Test Scores.” Education Next, August 15, 2008. . 
 
 
 
of ACT scores and college attendance are primarily from black and Hispanic populations, the 
study makes minimal reference to low-income populations.  
 
§2: Financial Incentives and Intrinsic Motivation 
Although the pursuit of equality in outcome, grounded in instrumental rationales, serves 
as the first principle of educational egalitarianism, it is not the sole end of egalitarianism. 
Educational egalitarianism should not just be concerned with the instrumental reasons of 
economic and employment outcomes but also concerned with the intrinsic purposes of education 
to develop one’s talents, pursue one’s interests, and realize one’s passions, which are good in 
themselves; to which no one’s rights should be limited. Consequently, the second pillar on which 
the concept of educational egalitarianism rests is the belief that a child’s ability to utilize and 
develop their talents shouldn’t be determined by factors outside of their control such as their 
socioeconomic status, race, gender, or other arbitrary determinants. Because education is a good 
which has both instrumental purpose and intrinsic value, even if the previously mentioned 
studies conclusively determined that financial incentives lead to better academic outcomes for 
low-income students, it still does not necessarily satisfy the normative question of whether such 
incentives should be implemented.12  
As Michael Sandel argues, introducing an instrumentalist mindset through the 
commodification of a good has moral limits. On this point Sandel presses two main objections: 
the fairness objection and the corruption objection.13 The fairness objection relates to the 
relationship between the market and inequality. He argues that markets for certain goods 
                                               
12 Shields, Liam, Anne Newman, and Debra Satz. “Equality of Educational Opportunity.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2017. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017.  
13 Sandel, Michael J. What Money Cant Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2013. 
 
 
 
shouldn’t be introduced on the basis that they would perpetuate structural and historical 
inequality. One example he uses to illustrate this objection is the introduction of a market for 
organs. An introduction of a market for organs, Sandel argues, would have a crowding-out effect 
of pricing low-income individuals out of the market; therefore leaving them unable to access life-
saving transplants. The crowding out effect of this example is aligned with the historical and 
structural inequalities that limit the poor from accessing equal health care resources leading to 
disparities in health outcomes across socioeconomic status. Contrary to a market in the sale of 
organs, a market for academic performance aims to reduce inequality by not only providing 
money to poor students, but also by incentivizing academic outcomes which could ultimately 
lead to higher lifetime earnings dependent upon a student’s future level of education. 
Consequently, financial incentives within the market of academic performance for low-income 
students would be ethically sound according to Sandel’s fairness objection.14  
 Since the introduction of financial incentives to achieve higher academic outcomes is 
specifically targeted at low-income populations, the crowding-out effect resulting from the 
introduction of a market in the transaction of organs is dramatically different from the crowding-
out effect of a market for academic performance. Debra Satz offers a further conception of the 
crowding-out principle as it relates to a market for academic performance. Rather than focusing 
on pricing individuals out of the market, Satz argues that monetary incentives can crowd out the 
intrinsic worth of the actions one hopes to encourage.15 Her contention is consistent with a 
considerable amount of additional studies which conclude that extrinsic motivations diminish the 
                                               
14 Brennan, Jason, and Peter Jaworski. Markets without Limits: Moral Virtues and Commercial Interests. New York: Routledge, 
Taylor & Francis Group, 2016. 
15 Satz, Debra. Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012. 194. 
 
 
 
value of any behavior for its own sake.16 By extrinsic motivation, I am referring to any factor 
which compels a student to learn, or attempt to learn, beyond his or her passion to learn for the 
sake of learning. For example, if a student were to read a book about the role of the Federal 
Reserve for no other reason than a genuine interest in learning about U.S. monetary policy, this 
would be considered intrinsically motivated. If that same student were to read this book, because 
of a genuine interest in addition to his desire to receive an A in their macroeconomics course, 
this would be considered extrinsically motivated.  
The monetization of K-12 education could serve to undermine the intrinsic value of 
learning in addition to the numerous positive externalities associated with school such as genuine 
friendships, the development of one’s character, and other values to a great extent. Satz’ 
conception of the crowding-out effect associated with extrinsic motivations perfectly 
corresponds with the second objection posed by Sandel; the corruption objection. To this end, 
financial incentives within the market of academic performance is ethically unjustified according 
to the crowding-out effect presented by Satz and the corruption objection offered by Sandel. 
Because of the lack of empirical evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of financial incentives 
in serving the instrumental purpose of education, in addition to a reduction of the intrinsic value 
of education as a result of their introduction, I reject the normative question of should cash 
incentives be used as an alternative means for improving the educational outcomes of low 
income students. 
§3: Implications for Grades 
                                               
16 Cerasoli, Christopher P., Jessica M. Nicklin, and Michael T. Ford. “Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives Jointly Predict 
Performance: A 40-Year Meta-Analysis.” Psychological Bulletin 140, no. 4 (2014): 980–1008. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035661. 
 
 
 
 
In light of the foregoing argument that the main objections against the provision of cash-
based incentives are both normatively and empirically supported, how should educators view 
other forms of incentives, such as grades and test scores? To review, I established the reduction 
of the intrinsic value of education for students who learn for cash, and evidence regarding the 
ineffectiveness of cash-incentives in terms of improving the academic outcomes of low-income 
students. If the two layered arguments against cash-incentives (intrinsic and instrumental) are 
accepted, I will argue that grades have similar effects on the education of underperforming 
students and their learning outcomes. If we are to accept these considerations for cash incentives, 
we must also accept them for the provision of grades on which our education system has so 
heavily relied.  
Grades, similar to money, serve as extrinsic motivations for students to learn and master 
subjects required in school. First, consider the crowding-out and corruption concerns raised by 
Satz and Sandel within the context of grading in K-12 public education. Grades offer students 
very little immediate tangible benefits as compared to cash. If a low-income student were to 
receive high marks at the end of the term, this would offer no immediate remedy for many of the 
challenges accompanying poverty such as food insecurity, home instability, adverse health 
outcomes and more. In fact, many may argue that the time focused on receiving high grades can 
take away time and energy which students could dedicate to alleviating some of these issues 
through working and contributing to the family income. Proponents of this view would argue 
that grades do not satisfy as extrinsic motivators because grades do not offer immediate benefits 
to low-income students and therefore do not serve as motivators in themselves.     
While the lack of immediate rewards resulting from receiving high grades, and students’ 
knowledge of this, has some degree of validity, it does not provide sufficient reasoning to 
 
 
 
conclude that grades do not serve as extrinsic motivators for students because of the long-term 
extrinsic motivations associated with receiving high grades. Beginning in high school in the K-
12 education system, although students may begin earlier, the grades students receive not only 
are permanently recorded on their academic transcript, but they also are typically aggregated 
under a common grading scale referred to as Grade Point Average(GPA); although there are 
some exceptions to this.  In immediate terms, if students do not perform at the minimal level 
determined at the district, state, and federal level, he/she will not graduate and receive their 
diploma. As previously stated, a high school diploma, or GED, is not sufficient to assure future 
economic stability for low-income students. Without their high school diploma, their likelihood 
of being impoverished is even greater.  
Beyond the actual completion of their degree, the strength of both their academic 
transcript and GPA are weighted heavily in college admission decisions and even some places of 
employment. Since there is the belief and evidence to show that a high school diploma is 
necessary but insufficient to achieving financial security above the poverty threshold, graduating 
from a college or university has come to dominate the narrative surrounding the instrumental 
purpose of education as a mechanism to alleviate structural and generational poverty. As a result, 
students are motivated to perform well, through grades and extracurriculars, in order for them to 
have the opportunity to attend an institution of higher learning. If the exponential increase in the 
number of students attending these institutions were the result of students who simply had the 
desire to further their education for the sake of learning, this would present a significant hole in 
my argument. However, self-reported studies have shown that students who wish to attend 
college or university are significantly motivated by the prospect of better employment outcomes 
 
 
 
in the future. For example, in 2016, 55% of students reported that they viewed college as 
necessary to workforce success. 17 
Instrumentally, grades as they have been utilized for decades have not contributed to the 
elimination of large-scale systematic improvements in the achievement outcomes of students 
within historically underperforming groups. In fact, grades and the performance metrics by 
which we evaluate them, have only exacerbated the racial and socioeconomic disparities in the 
student achievement gap. The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) currently is 
the most effective tool for educators and policymakers to measure disparities in student 
achievement in math and reading proficiency. According to this assessment, racial disparities 
have steadily decreased since the 1990s and are approximately over 30% smaller than in the 
1970s. 18 While this reflects a move in the right direction towards the instrumental end of 
educational egalitarianism, racial disparities in student achievement continue to persist as 
Hispanic-white gaps and Black-white gaps range from .5 standard deviations to .9 standard 
deviations respectively for math. Even more troubling, socioeconomic disparities do not follow 
the same declining trend as racial disparities throughout the last three decades. Conversely, 
socioeconomic disparities have increased by over 60% since the 1960s and are now about twice 
as large as the national racial achievement gap.19 This trend reflects a retreat from the 
instrumental aim of educational egalitarianism and is a primary driver behind the growing 
interest in the implementation of financial incentives to underperforming students who are much 
more likely to come from lower socioeconomic backgrounds.20 
                                               
17 “Why Do Americans Go to College? First and Foremost, They Want Better Jobs.” Washington Post. Accessed 
September 12, 2018.  
18 “The Educational Opportunity Monitoring Project: Racial and Ethnic Achievement Gaps.” n.d. Accessed March 8, 2019. 
19 Paul, Annie Murphy. n.d. “In Defense of School Testing.” Time. Accessed March 8, 2019.  
20 “Whither Opportunity? Rising Inequality, Schools, and Children’s Life Chances.” 2012. Choice Reviews Online 49 (10): 49-
5804-49–5804. 
 
 
 
One may reply that while cash serves solely as an incentive, grades perform as incentives 
and for pedagogical purposes. According to this view, grades serve the purpose of not only 
motivating students but also as a critical tool to accurately understand a student’s level of 
proficiency for a given subject or topic. However, I do not find this argument sufficient to 
undermine the similarities among the effect of cash and grading incentives due to neither 
incentive occurring in isolation of the feedback mechanism required to develop learning. 
 If educators were to award high achieving students with money or not reward 
underachieving students with cash without grounding their decision based on some evaluative 
metric, such as a test, or communicating with students the reward criteria then this objection 
would hold true and cash incentives would only serve the purpose as an incentive. In accepting 
this argument however, the same argument would apply to grades. If educators were to award 
grades without rationalizing a student’s grade based off some evaluative metric or without 
informing students of the grading criteria, to what pedagogical end would grades serve? The 
contention that cash incentives do not hold pedagogical purposes rests on the misguided 
assumption that cash incentives exist in isolation of the pedagogical mechanism of assessment 
and feedback which characterizes the carrot-stick model. Cash incentives, as they have been used 
for research purposes, would not be instruments which disrupt this traditional mechanism, but 
merely a new flavor. Money, identical to grades, reflect feedback of a student’s performance 
which comprises the second component of the pedagogical machine. Student B receiving an A 
on an assignment reflects their proficiency on a given subject to the same extent as if that same 
student received $50 assuming that schools used the scale within the Fryer study. Thus, cash and 
grades should be understood as synonymous not only in terms of their effects on the intrinsic 
value of education but also in terms of their ability to reflect and act as feedback mechanisms 
 
 
 
within the broader carrot-stick pedagogical framework to which the U.S. public education system 
by-and-large subscribes.  
One point of contention, however, could be made regarding the short vs. long term 
incentivization effects of financial incentives compared to grading incentives. Because of the 
immediate nature and benefit of financial gains, cash incentives incentivize in the short run more 
effectively than in the long run. Conversely, grading incentives serve as long-term instrumental 
motivators to a greater extent than cash incentives due to the deferred benefit received by high 
achieving students in the form of admission and greater funding for higher education which as 
we have already established, dramatically improves one’s career and economic outlook in the 
future. To the degree this is valid, it could result in cash and grades having drastically different 
effects in motivating students toward achievement metrics. However, given the novelty of 
financial incentives within education, the research has only examined the effects of cash 
incentives in the short run as evidenced by the Fryer and Jackson studies. Additionally, the 
empirical data does not support this claim given that the increase in short-run motivation derived 
from financial incentives were minimal at best.  
§4: A Revisionary Proposal: Reducing the Saliency of Evaluative Standards 
The aim of the Revisionary Proposal is concerned with conceptualizing how the ideal of 
educational egalitarianism should be manifested within public education, given our objections to 
the carrot-stick model, rather than making tangible policy recommendations which may be 
constrained due to additional factors such as political expediency and economic climate. This 
revisionary model posits that the egalitarian failure of the carrot-stick incentive model, both 
intrinsically and instrumentally, is not a result of the incentives themselves but rather their 
reliance on evaluative standards which necessarily undermine the identities of students at the 
 
 
 
margin. Because of this, the revisionary model explicitly states: Educators should re-
conceptualize student achievement from the current trajectory which increasingly prioritizes the 
methods by which students are incentivized to conform to evaluative metrics to a less rigid 
conception of student achievement that conforms the evaluative metrics to the student. The 
former, whether through cash or grades, forces underperforming student A either to 
fundamentally change certain qualities or habits in order to succeed or get left behind both 
academically and in the future professionally. The latter on the other hand, allows that same 
student the flexibility to develop their passions, perfect, and market their unique skill set in the 
absence of strict evaluation parameters without necessarily being punished in terms of future 
career and economic outcomes.  
Measurements of student potential through standardized evaluations are salient within the 
framework of the public education system and labor market to the extent that they are used to 
determine a student’s eligibility for selective secondary schools, entrance into higher education, 
employment outcomes, and to evaluate and justify compensation of teachers, schools, and school 
districts as a whole. Such a heavy reliance forces intense downward pressure on the students to 
perform academically to the extent that it crowds out many of the interests and potentially 
lucrative skill sets which are not assessed by standardized tests. If public education officials and 
administrators were to eliminate grading standards altogether, students would no longer be as 
intensely encouraged to merely “learn for the test” or extrinsically motivated to learn topics of 
little interest to them by the prospect of securing a more lucrative career outcome; which would 
move us closer toward the intrinsic end of educational egalitarianism. 
Under the revisionary proposal, suppose students in Fairfax County Public Schools were 
still assessed using the end of year Standards of Learning (SOL) examination and still received 
 
 
 
final grades at the end of each term. While Fairfax County Public Schools would still be 
permitted to evaluate its students via grading standards strictly to provide feedback and promote 
learning, it would not allow such standards to be used in the evaluation of their students by 
institutions of higher education nor employers. This would manifest itself institutionally by 
prohibiting schools from releasing academic transcripts to universities and restricting employers 
and universities from requesting academic information such as G.P.A. or standardized exam 
scores such as the SAT/ACT.  
Pedagogically, such a measure would diminish the downward pressure experienced both 
by teachers to “teach to the test” and students to strictly learn for the test. Within the classroom 
setting, this would ideally result in greater curricular and pedagogical diversity by schools being 
able to broaden the expertise and backgrounds of their teachers, allowing them to infuse their 
own creative spin within core classes of math, language, history, and science in addition to 
increased elective options. By fostering greater curricular diversity, the genuine and intrinsic 
interests of a wider segment of students can be reached and nurtured as students who previously 
lacked interest in the limited and restrictive material of the past would more likely be able to 
connect their unique interests with potentially greater academic choices available to them. Not 
only this, but allowing for greater curricular diversity signals to students that their autonomy and 
identity is at the very least attempting to be valued by the institution which generates trust and 
greater intrinsic value of education for the student. With greater intrinsic interest in a far greater 
segment of the student population, innovating new or more intensified incentive schemes would 
become somewhat unnecessary as students would be increasingly driven simply by their own to 
learn and hone their skills. Ultimately, by reducing the value that such metrics have on the 
immediate and long-term outcomes of students, the incentivizing mechanism of student 
 
 
 
achievement metrics is diminished as students will no longer fear, or become numb to, the ever-
compounding stick associated with underperformance or feel cumbersomely pressured toward 
the elusive carrot of high academic achievement. 
Fortunately, many schools and districts within the Northeastern region of the U.S. have 
already begun implementing models similar to that of which I propose such as the PACE pilot 
across the state of New Hampshire, Bard Early Colleges in New York, and Montessori Schools. 
The state of New Hampshire has successfully implemented assessment policies which 
significantly reduce the saliency of traditional grading practices arguably without threats to 
student motivation using participation rates as an indicator of motivation. In 2015, New 
Hampshire implemented the two-year Performance Assessment of Competency Education 
(PACE) pilot which was the first federally funded assessment program minimizing the salience 
and reliance on standardized metrics.21 This strategy is designed to limit statewide assessments to 
only twice during primary school (grades 3-8), and once in secondary school (grade 11) while 
charging instructors throughout the district to collaborate and develop competencies and skills 
tailored to the local needs and interests of the students; referred to as competency or mastery-
based learning. For example, in the Sanborn Regional School District, fourth grade social studies 
students have traditionally been tested on facts about the NH legislature and governor, however 
through PACE, students are now students are evaluated on their ability to propose a bill and 
defend it in a mock hearing.22 The effect of the pilot has been significant; for both reading and 
math assessments, students’ scores improved by more than 3% statewide after the first year.23 
Additionally, reading scores for second grade students increased from 29% to 77% while special 
                                               
21 “Performance Assessment of Competency Education (PACE).” Accessed April 20, 2019.  
22 “Goodbye ABCs: How One State Is Moving Beyond Grade Levels and Graded Assessments - EdSurge News.” EdSurge, May 
16, 2017. 
23 “2015-16 Statewide Assessment Results | NH Department of Education.” Accessed April 21, 2019.  
 
 
 
education referrals decreased by 21%  during this same time period.24 As a result of these 
improvements, the NH DOE extended the program in 2018 to continue in the direction away 
from standardized assessments.  
 
§5: Instrumental Threat of the Revisionary Proposal 
 Up to this point, I have argued that the Revisionary Proposal offers public education 
officials a method to step closer toward the intrinsic end of educational egalitarianism that the 
current carrot-stick model fails to reach. However, to what extent does the Revisionary Proposal 
achieve the instrumental end of educational egalitarianism? Christopher Knapp, a leading 
educational philosopher, argues that a model similar to the Revisionary Proposal would fail to 
achieve this instrumental end but potentially exacerbate economic inequities to a greater extent 
than the carrot-stick incentive structure; which I reject. Contrary to the revisionary proposal 
which calls for reduced salience of consistent and standardized evaluative metrics, Knapp argues 
that inconsistent evaluative standards to which incentives are aimed undermines educational 
egalitarianism rather than promotes it.25 Because students participate in the same academic 
competition, the argument goes, the standards by which we judge student performance (grades 
and test scores) should be perfectly consistent across students and institutions if equality and 
fairness are to be achieved. As a result of relaxing the standards, teachers will be able to give 
students unfair and objectively unsubstantiated evaluations through similar mechanisms that I 
proposed as alternatives within the Revisionary Proposal such as letters of recommendation. 
Additionally, institutions of higher education and employers will be able to make admissions and 
                                               
24 “Goodbye ABCs: How One State Is Moving Beyond Grade Levels and Graded Assessments - EdSurge News.” EdSurge, May 
16, 2017. 
25 Knapp, Christopher. 2007. “Assessing Grading.” Public Affairs Quarterly 21 (3): 275–294. 
 
 
 
hiring decisions similarly based upon unjustified rationales which would not serve to advance the 
long-term instrumental ends of perpetually underperforming students any more than cash or 
grading incentive schemes.26 
 According to this objection presented by Knapp, racial and socioeconomic disparities 
currently present within education would be exacerbated as the result of the Revisionary 
Proposal. Increasingly subjective measures will not only grant teachers the ability to use 
objectively unsubstantiated evaluation criteria, but a lack of standardized evaluation criteria 
could potentially lead to evaluators relying on considerations of race, ethnicity, gender and other 
forms of identity categorizations as a means of perpetuating discrimination against those within 
marginalized groups. This objection, if valid, could potentially suggest that the Revisionary 
Proposal would threaten the instrumental ends of education to a greater extent than the current 
carrot-stick model by further placing students within marginalized groups at an even greater 
disadvantage. I will reject this objection posed by Knapp through consulting evidence of 
standardization inherently conflicting with the cultural identities of those who typically 
underperform provided by Jennifer Morton and Christopher Emdin. 
In theory, standardized evaluative metrics within public education as argued by Knapp 
would be morally unobjectionable on egalitarian terms. This is due to the nature of standards to 
naturally consolidate values and reject contingencies and outliers. Within the context of public 
education, increasing reliance and saliency of standardized performance measurements has the 
result of further restricting and narrowing our conception of academic achievement which could 
account for the growing tension between the increasingly diverse society of the United States and 
the public education system’s continued reliance on narrow evaluative metrics. This is supported 
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through Jennifer Morton’s work on cognitive dispositions supports my argument rejecting 
increased evaluative standardization. She suggests that a key factor contributing to income and 
racial achievement gaps is inherently biased standards which place higher value on cognitive 
dispositions and devalue non-cognitive dispositions which minority students tend to employ to a 
greater extent than their counterparts.27 She defines cognitive dispositions as “those that have a 
basis in or are related to conscious intellectual activity, explicit reasoning, mathematical and 
verbal ability, and are often measured by standardized tests.”28 In contrast, she defines non-
cognitive dispositions as those related to, “motivational, social, and emotional dispositions such 
as self-control, perseverance, emotional stability, self-esteem, etc.”29 Based off these definitions, 
the saliency and prevalence of grading through standardized testing supports the argument that 
K-12 public education places greater emphasis and offers greater rewards to those who develop 
their cognitive dispositions, most notably at the secondary level. In fact, students who exhibit 
high levels of non-cognitive dispositions are frequently punished for behaving outside the norm 
such as the student who uses creative expressions of music to help herself focus or the student 
who is genuinely interested in the instruction material yet independently explores a subtopic not 
specified in the curriculum; both of whom may appear disrespectful to the instructor or as 
students who do not wish to learn.  
Morton supports her claim through research regarding differing parenting styles between 
middle class and working-class parents conducted by Annette Lareau, a Professor of sociology at 
the University of Pennsylvania. Utilizing Lareau’s research, Morton contends that students from 
minority and low-income backgrounds further develop non-cognitive dispositions due to 
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working class parents assisting their children to develop naturally and with a different relation to 
authority than children coming from middle class families.30The value differentiation between 
cognitive and non-cognitive dispositions provided by Morton depicts an inherent bias of the 
purportedly objective achievement benchmarks which directly contributes to racial and 
socioeconomic achievement gaps. Within this framework, one reason incentives may fail 
instrumentally to significantly improve the achievement outcomes of underperforming students 
is that the ends to which they seek motivate lower income students’ conflict with their own 
identities and upbringing. As a result, a student does not perceive the potential reward resulting 
from the incentive as sufficient compensation for the potential loss of parts of their cultural 
identity.  
Christopher Emdin, a former high school teacher and the current director of the Institute 
for Urban and Minority education at Columbia University, provides further evidence to 
undermine the view presented by Knapp in his book “For White Folks Who Teach in the Hood”. 
He states that, “The noncosmopolitan classroom results in alienating the neo indigenous… This 
type of classroom forces students to deny their natural abilities and talents and punishes those 
who refuse to comply while concurrently placing at a disadvantage those who seek to acclimate.” 
31The cultural debasement arising from narrow evaluative metrics tangibly manifests itself 
through code-switching which both Morton and Emdin refer to throughout their literature. Code-
switching, meaning the practice of tailoring one’s language, tone of voice, and diction to 
different environments reflects a student’s suppression of their own cultural identity through 
language in order to conform to the norm set within the educational setting. For many minority, 
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lower-income, and ELL students, code-switching becomes necessary in order to achieve 
academically as students are expected to employ the formal writing and language rules taught 
throughout school. Not only do formal speech and writing standards unfairly disadvantage those 
whose language inside the classroom setting sharply contrasts their language outside the 
classroom but they also convey to the student that their cultural identity, and therefore 
intelligence, is not as valued as their counterparts within the educational setting.  
The appeals to cultural variances by Morton and Emdin provide evidence that the 
incentive-reward mechanism in K-12 public education not only fails to achieve but is 
incompatible with the ideal of educational egalitarianism. Educational incentives inherently must 
be designed toward a particular end that currently exist in the forms of achievement standards. 
Despite the objection offered by Knapp, the benchmarks education officials set, no matter how 
consistent, must result in students who excel and students who struggle. Because educational 
standards reflect and place value on the traditional norms of the majority, which historically has 
been tailored to white cisgender males, the benchmarks by which we assess student achievement 
directly conflict with the core identities of immigrants and low-income students of color. Due to 
the growing multiculturalism within U.S. society, if educational achievement standards and the 
incentives through which students are expected to achieve them continue to operate within such 
narrow parameters, the inequalities persistent within achievement gaps will only become 
exacerbated. if we accept the previous cultural argument that evaluative standards run 
increasingly counter to the identities and learned skill sets of those who disproportionately 
underperform, it becomes apparent that their value and salience within access to higher education 
and the labor market forms the basis for the moral unjustification of student achievement 
outcomes.  
 
 
 
However compelling the evidence presented by Morton and Emdin regarding the cultural 
clash between marginalized students and increasing evaluative standardization may be, this does 
not serve as conclusive evidence to invalidate Knapp’s objection that educational inequities 
would be further exacerbated resulting from the Revisionary Proposal. Despite the evidence to 
suggest the contrary, I will assume that Knapp’s argument is valid and that the Revisionary 
Proposal results in greater inequities within education. Does this serve as reason to unjustify the 
proposal solely on the grounds that it threatens the instrumental ends of education by worsening 
economic outcomes for an additional number of students? I argue that the objection presented by 
Knapp, even if we are to assume it as valid, still does not serve as grounds to unjustify the 
revisionary proposal due to the greater weight and value gained by students from the intrinsic 
ends of education. On balance, the extent to which the revisionary proposal would exacerbate 
educational disparities would need to be great to outweigh the intrinsic ends promoted by the 
revisionary proposal. Given the significant level seemingly “objective” evaluative metrics 
already perpetuate educational disparities, it would be unlikely that the Revisionary Proposal 
would serve to exacerbate them considerably further.  
Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this paper is not intended to conclusively advocate for any specific policy 
recommendations as it would require much greater econometric and statistical analysis. 
However, the goal of this work is to rigorously grapple with the underlying philosophy and belief 
formation which ultimately drives policy decisions. In principle, I do not maintain that incentives 
are universally ineffective, rather I conclude that in practice, incentives are both ineffective and 
morally objectionable to the extent that they conform students toward ends (evaluative metrics) 
which diminish a student’s intrinsic motivation in addition to inherently disadvantaging certain 
 
 
 
students over others. While literature and small-scale alternative models to the current evaluative 
system exist, such as PACE & Bard, my work highlights the pressing need for greater attention 
toward systematically re-shaping the beliefs systems undergirding educational techniques rather 
than the techniques themselves in order to shift what and who is valued by public education. 
History and ample data have demonstrated the ineffectiveness and moral objections associated 
with the carrot-stick model manifested by grading incentives and most recently through cash 
incentives. The growing emphasis to innovate and devise such incentive structures not only 
highlight the severity of achievement gaps, but more dangerously reflect the ignorance and 
possible desire of policy makers to undermine, minimize, and threaten the identities and unique 
experiences of students who do not fit the prototypical mold valued within educational settings. 
While financial incentives could present a dramatic shift in the way students are educated, 
education officials must first seriously consider and develop a consistent foundational 
understanding of the ideal end(s) of education and the role of egalitarianism within it. Until then, 
administrators and policy makers will continue offering carrots to swaths of students who never 
desired to eat them.  
   
 
 
 
